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Abstract 
Moral psychology is controversial regarding the question whether it is universal or 
culturally relative. One option is to refrain from imposing theoretical constraints in the 
assessment of morality, and instead to ask laypeople from different cultures how they 
conceptualize morality. Our paper is the first to adopt this approach by examining 
laypeople’s associations of the moral person in individualistic- and collectivistic-
oriented cultures. Using correspondence analysis we found that the concept of the moral 
person yields associations with justice and welfare concerns that are widely shared. Yet, 
as expected, there were also clear cultural differences with individualistic-oriented 
samples associating more frequently rights-based attributes and collectivistic-oriented 
samples duty-based attributes. When matching the free-listed trait categories with 
Schwartz´ (1992) ten value types, the moral values hierarchy was very similar across 
cultures. Imposing constraints through expert-designed category systems may mask 
cultural differences and narrow the scope of inquiry to universal aspects of morality.  
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Morality is probably one of the most controversial topics when it comes to the question 
whether it is universal or culturally relative (cf. Frimer & Walker, 2008). Moral 
psychology has a long history of advocating the universalism position (Kohlberg, 1984; 
Turiel, 1983), yet more recent theorizing suggests that it is likely that there is both a 
universal and culturally-specific morality (e.g., Haidt, 2008). Despite the recent 
theoretical advancements in this area, there is still a great deal of ambiguity as to which 
elements of the human moral system are exactly universal and which ones are culturally 
specific. Divergent findings that lend support to either the moral universalism or 
relativism position may be due to different definitions of morality and divergent 
methodological approaches in studying the moral domain. In this paper, we aim to bring 
some clarity to the matter by carefully reviewing the literature and presenting a 
synthesis from which we derive our hypothesis on moral universals and specifics. We 
then empirically compare how individuals from four different cultures conceive 
morality and whether similarities and differences are in line with our theoretical 
proposition.  
More specifically, we are interested in how laypeople conceive morality if they 
are not given any external cues. Most studies use expert-designed taxonomies and self-
report measures to assess individuals´ moral conceptions (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 
1997; Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Nucci, Turiel, & 
Encarnacion-Gawrych, 1983). Yet, this may narrow the focus of study to what the 
experts define as moral. By using a laypeople´s perspective we circumvent this problem 
and leave it entirely to the respondents on what qualifies as moral and what does not. 
We also use the opportunity to compare our results to data from the Schwartz Value 
Survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1992) which is an expert-designed value taxonomy and which 
contains some value types that have been theorized to belong to the moral domain 
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(Helkama, 2004). We aim to identify the methodological implications of adopting one 
or the other approach.  
Moral Universalism 
The moral universalism perspective posits that there is a universal morality that 
can be attained through rational reflection (Kohlberg, 1984; Turiel, 1983). Justice, rights 
and welfare are seen as the pinnacle of moral maturity and used for definitions of what 
belongs to the moral domain and what does not. The moral domain has usually been 
assessed through moral reasoning. For instance, in Turiel´s (2002) studies participants 
were asked questions about rule violations, e.g., whether the act would be OK in 
another country or whether the transgressor should be punished. The empirical findings 
corroborated that violations of justice, rights and welfare concerns are widely judged as 
wrong and as moral matters.  
A very different line of research, i.e. values research based on Schwartz´ (1992) 
values theory, has also come to the conclusion that there is a set of universal moral 
values; however not limited to justice, rights and welfare concerns. Schwartz (1992) 
developed an expert-designed category system that identifies ten value types: power, 
achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, 
conformity, tradition, and security. He also constructed a measure, the Schwartz Value 
Survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1992), in which participants are asked to rate a set of value 
items according to their personal importance. To date, the SVS has been used in more 
than 70 countries validating the existence of the 10 main value types (Davidov, 
Schmidt, & Schwartz, 2008; Schwartz, 2006a; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995; Spini, 2003). 
Based on this value theory, Helkama (2004) proposed that the most important moral 
values that may be widely shared across cultures should be universalism, benevolence 
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and conformity/ tradition. These value types serve important functions of morality in 
every culture: Universalism serves moral problem-solving (resolving value conflicts and 
issues of justice), benevolence serves the promotion of prosocial actions (being kind and 
considerate towards others) and conformity/ tradition serves the control of antisocial 
action (resistance to temptation). The moral importance of these three value types has 
been empirically corroborated in studies in which participants were explicitly asked 
about their moral values (Schwartz, 2007; Vauclair et al., 2012).  
In sum, the moral universalism perspective suggests that justice, rights, and 
welfare are part of a universal set of moral values. Researchers adopting a values theory 
approach (e.g., Helkama, 2004; Schwartz, 2007) further suggest that conformity values 
are also widely shared moral values which are considered to be part of the social 
conventional domain in the moral reasoning approach (e.g., Turiel, 1983, 2002). We 
think that conformity may indeed be widely shared as an abstract value. Conformity has 
emerged very early in evolution (Moghaddam, Slocum, Finkel, Tzili, & Harré, 2000) 
serving an important social function by making sure that individuals conform to certain 
desirable standards which help organizing collective life (Moghaddam, Slocum, Finkel, 
Tzili, & Harré, 2000). Hence, if the abstract value of conformity is assessed (and not a 
concrete rule) it is very likely that this is recognized as an important moral value across 
different cultures.  
Culture and Morality 
Findings from cross-cultural studies raised the question whether pluralistic 
conceptions of morality may exist (e.g. Nisan, 1987, Shweder, et al., 1987). Following a 
series of interviews on moral discourse in India, Brazil and the United States, Shweder, 
Much, Mahapatra, & Park (1997) developed the ‘big three’ theory of morality: the 
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ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity. The ethic of Autonomy contains moral 
values and virtues related to justice, rights and prevention from harm. Moral agents are 
defined as independent people who are free to make their own choices, only restricted 
by concerns whether their behaviour would inflict harm on others or restrict their rights. 
The ethic of Community defines the moral agents in terms of their interdependence or 
membership to social groups and the obligations that go along with this membership. 
Moral values and virtues are those that benefit the functioning of the community, such 
as duty, honour, chastity, respect, modesty, and self-control. The ethic of Divinity 
defines the moral agents as spiritual entities who aim to follow divine laws in the 
attempt to achieve moral purity. Moral values and virtues are often derived from 
religious authorities and texts, and are those that protect and dignify the divinity 
inherent in people. These three ethics vary in their emphasis and distribution across 
cultures. The ethic of Autonomy has been found in both Western and non-Western 
moral discourse, whereas the ethic of Community and Divinity is also important in 
collectivistic-oriented cultures such as Asian cultures (e.g., Haidt, et al., 1993; cf. 
Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990; Shweder, et al., 1997).  
More recently, Graham, Haidt and Nosek (2009) identified two major ´moral 
foundations´ that appear consistently in lists of values (e.g., the SVS, Schwartz, 1992) 
and taxonomies from anthropology, psychology, and evolutionary theories about human 
and primate sociality. They labeled these foundations the individualizing and the 
binding foundation. The individualizing foundation emphasizes justice, rights and 
welfare concerns of individuals and the authors state that it corresponds to Kohlberg´s 
ethic of justice, Shweder et al´s (1997) ethic of autonomy and Schwartz´ values of 
universalism and benevolence. The binding foundation emphasizes group concerns, 
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such as duty, and self-control, and corresponds to Shweder et al.´s (1997) ethic of 
Community/ Divinity and Schwartz´ values of conformity and tradition.  
In sum, the moral relativism perspective acknowledges that justice, rights and 
welfare are widely shared moral concerns, but that some cultures also care about group 
and religious concerns. We think that one important issue with this conceptualization of 
morality is that it conflates two different moral concerns, i.e. the concern about justice/ 
welfare and the concern about rights. While the former is likely to be widely shared, 
because the universal rules of social cooperation dictate to be fair, not to cheat, deceive 
or intentionally harm someone (Richerson & Boyd, 2005), the latter is likely to show 
more variation across cultures.  
The concept of rights can be conceived as the counterpart of the concept of 
duties (Chiu, et al., 1997; Dworkin,1978). Rights- and duty-based moral orientations 
define conceptions of an individual´s choices and conduct in a society. Duty-based 
cultures are more restrictive and individuals believe in a fixed socio-moral reality, i.e. a 
rigid moral order prescribing what is right or wrong. The dominant moral orientation is 
toward supporting the status quo and therefore it is a system-oriented morality. Rights-
based cultures are more flexible and believe in a malleable socio-moral reality, i.e. the 
authority of the existing moral order is no longer absolute and primary concern is to 
uphold fundamental human rights. The dominant moral orientation is towards 
promoting social change and it is therefore a person-centered morality. Chiu, et al. 
(1997) corroborated that there is cultural variation in these moral orientations consistent 
with what one would expect:  US-Americans gave priority to a rights-based morality, 
whereas Hong Kong Chinese gave priority to a more duty-based morality. More recent 
empirical findings from a large scale comparative study also showed that people from 
more collectivistic cultures are less accepting of personal rights and choices (e.g., 
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homosexuality, divorce, abortion) than individuals from more individualistic cultures 
(Vauclair & Fischer, 2011). Yet, contemporary theories on morality usually blend 
universal justice and welfare concerns with rights concerns which might in fact be 
regarded as more or less important depending on the culture.  
Laypeople´s Conception of Morality 
One limitation of past research, which may have led to the blending of rights and 
justice/welfare concerns, is that researchers have mostly employed expert-designed 
measures or taxonomies (e.g., Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Graham, et al., 2009; Nucci, et 
al., 1983) to study individual´s moral orientation and possible cultural variations. The 
problem is that the researchers impose their definition of morality onto their participants 
and this may narrow the focus of study to what the experts regard as relevant. An 
alternative is to leave it entirely to the respondents on what qualifies as moral and to 
examine to what extent rights and duties emerge as moral concerns in different cultures 
and whether there are also shared justice/ welfare concerns. One way of doing so is to use 
prototype analysis (Rosch, 1975) in which a group of laypeople are asked to free-list the 
attributes they associate with a concept’s meaning.  
When prototypes are studied, researchers typically rely on two samples of 
informants: the ‘nominators’ who generate features of the prototype through free-listings, 
and the ‘raters’ who rate the importance of each feature in terms of how well it defines 
the prototype in question (Horowitz & Turan, 2008). However, more recently prototypes 
have also been inferred from the first step alone, i.e. from the free-listed features produced 
by nominators (see e.g., Gregg, Hart, Sedikides, & Kumashiro, 2008; Smith, et al., 2007). 
The underlying assumption hereby is that the group-generated frequencies of attributes 
are already an index of everyday accessibility in the particular sample in which it has 
been produced. Moreover since it is a group-generated prototype, it describes the 
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normative associative meaning of a term and reflects a form of “collective wisdom” 
(Horowitz & Turan, 2008, p. 1059) and is therefore especially intriguing for a cross-
cultural study.   
There are a few studies that examined laypeople´s associations with moral 
concepts. Yet, there are a number of shortcomings that motivated us to conduct the 
present study. First, the possibility that people from different cultures could have different 
conceptions of morality has not been examined (see Lapsley & Lasky, 2001; Walker & 
Pitts, 1998). Second, examining what laypeople associate with morality has not been the 
focus of past studies (Smith, Türk Smith, & Christopher, 2007). Third, it has been argued 
that attributes of the moral prototype can be understood as implicit moral values (Smith, 
et al., 2007), yet there is no study that compared implicit moral value hierarchies with 
explicit measures of moral value hierarchies.  
Summary of Research Goals and Hypotheses 
Our aim was to study the moral prototype across cultures. We first examined 
cultural similarities and differences in the moral prototype and whether they fit recent 
theorizing on moral universalism and relativism. We expected attributes related to 
justice and welfare to be widely shared, however, attributes related to duties to be more 
often mentioned in the collectivistic-oriented samples and attributes related to rights to 
be more prominent in the individualistic-oriented samples.  
We also compared moral values obtained through the prototype analyses 
implicitly with explicit moral value ratings with the SVS. We expected that after forcing 
free-listed traits into expert-designed categories, implicit and explicit moral value 
assessments should produce similar moral value hierarchies, with universalism, 
benevolence and conformity being at the top, since they serve universal functions of 
morality in the abstract (see Helkama, 2004).  
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Method 
Participants 
A total of 458 university students from the social sciences participated in this 
study. Participants were recruited from two individualistic- (New Zealand, Germany) and 
two collectivistic-oriented cultures (The Philippines, Brazil) according to past research 
(see Hofstede, 2001; Schwartz, 2006b). Respondents were only included in the analysis 
if they identified with the country of residence as assessed in the survey. Hence, responses 
were analyzed from 98 Brazilians, 119 Germans, 108 Filipinos and 90 students from New 
Zealand (see Table 1 for more details about the samples).  
There were significant age differences across the four samples, F(3, 425) = 72.93, 
p < .001, and also differences in the proportion of females, c²(3) = 16.39, p < .001. 
Respondents’ average age was highest in Brazil and Germany (MBrazil = 23.62, SD = 4.77; 
MGermany = 23.61, SD = 4.94) and lowest in the Philippines (M = 17.32, SD = 1.15). These 
age groups correspond roughly to differences in student profiles as a result of different 
university entry requirements in each country. The New Zealand sample showed the 
highest percentage of females (71%) and the Brazilian sample the lowest (49%). The 
samples reflect the typical gender composition in the social sciences with females being 
often in the majority.  
Table 1  
Procedure 
Participants were first asked to provide basic demographic information. They 
were then asked to write down what kind of characteristics they associate with a moral 
person. The Filipino sample received the instruction in English, since English is one of 
the official languages in the Philippines. Participants from Germany responded in 
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German and those from Brazil in Portuguese to the free-listing task. We analyzed the 
first six attributes that respondents wrote down.  
Analytical Strategy 
Content analysis. We translated free-listed attributes from German and 
Portuguese into English using a community approach (Harkness, 2003) with two 
bilingual translators for each language. The number of elicited traits was 590 for the 
Filipino moral target sample, 496 for the New Zealand sample, 608 for the German and 
512 for the Brazilian sample.  
The frequency analysis was done in two stages: In the first (intra-cultural) 
stage, frequencies of word stems (e.g., honest and honesty were both coded as honest) 
were analyzed separately in each culture with the software program MAXQDA 2007 
(Kuckartz, 2007). Idiosyncratic attributes not directly related to the question were 
dropped (e.g., ‘children’s books’). The second (pan-cultural) stage consisted of pooling 
all free-listed features regardless of the respective cultural group in which they have 
been listed to identify common categories that may underlie the data. The categorization 
of all free-listed attributes was done by two independent raters who reduced the 
attributes to 49 distinct moral trait categories. Inter-rater reliability for assigning 
attributes to categories that have been established independently by both raters was 
acceptable, yet moderate (κ = .48, see Landis & Koch, 1977). Discrepancies were 
discussed with a colleague, who was naïve to the hypothesis, until agreement and 
consistency in the categorization and labelling of the categories was achieved. The 
frequencies of the final attributes in the respective trait categories were added up. Only 
categories that were mentioned by at least five percent of the respondents in any one of 
the samples were retained and further analyzed cross-culturally.  
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Correspondence analysis. We applied a correspondence analysis (in SPSS 14) to 
the final trait categories. Correspondence analysis is a multidimensional scaling 
technique that creates a perceptual map. Variables and objects (here trait categories and 
samples) are simultaneously plotted in the map based on the association between them 
(for technical details on this technique, see e.g., Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & 
Tatham, 2006). In our case, this method allows us to visualize (1) how similar or 
different cultural samples are in their free-listed associations, and (2) what kind of trait 
categories are associated with which samples.    
Results and Discussion 
Comparing Laypeople´s Associations of the Moral Person Across Cultures 
We analyzed responses from the New Zealand, Filipino, Brazilian and German 
sample on the moral target concept in order to identify possible cultural similarities and 
differences in the moral prototype. We focused on moral attributes that emerged as 
central in each cultural sample. Central attributes are those that are highly accessible 
and therefore occur with a relatively high frequency compared to peripheral attributes 
(cf. Gregg, et al., 2008; Smith, et al., 2007). A scree test was used as an aid to 
differentiate between central (frequent) and peripheral (non-frequent) trait categories in 
which the relative frequencies were arranged in descending order along the ordinate and 
the features along the abscissa. The cut-off point between central and peripheral trait 
categories is where there is a substantial change in the gradient of the slope. We then 
applied a correspondence analysis on the central trait categories.  
The scree test yielded eleven central trait categories in the Brazilian and German 
sample, twelve in the New Zealand and nine in the Filipino sample. Central and peripheral 
trait categories for all four cultural groups and the associated frequencies can be seen in 
Table 2. The results show that honest was a shared central moral trait category (occurring 
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in all four cultural samples), followed by friendly, good and just (central in three samples). 
These attributes are consistent with the moral universalism perspective that morality is a 
matter of welfare and justice (see e.g., Kohlberg, 1984; Turiel, 1983). Culturally 
idiosyncratic trait categories were open, critical, reliable and obedient in the German 
sample and correct, serious, educated, responsible, loyal and sociable in the Brazilian 
sample. Well-mannered was an idiosyncratic central moral category in the Filipino 
sample and caring, strong, and trustworthy were central and specific to the New Zealand 
sample.  
Table 2 
Correlating the frequencies of the central moral trait categories of the different 
samples with each other showed that none of the samples were significantly similar to 
each other, except for the New Zealand and Filipino sample which reached marginal 
significance (rs = .41, p = .05). The correspondence analysis on all central moral trait 
categories across the four cultural samples produced a significant chi-square (c²(75) = 
745.23, p < .001), therefore there was a significant relationship between the samples and 
trait categories. The total inertia indicated that the three dimensions explained 50.7% of 
the variance in the original correspondence table. The first dimension explained 45% of 
the inertia, the second 30.9% and the third dimension 24%. Even though the third 
dimension added a considerable amount of explained variance, the first two dimensions 
already explained about three-quarters of the total inertia. Hence, to facilitate the 
interpretation of the perceptual map, only two dimensions were retained. The resulting 
two-dimensional biplot is depicted in Figure 1.  
The triangular shape of the biplot is due to the distinctive responses of the 
German, Filipino and Brazilian sample, while traits shared across the four cultural 
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samples are located at the centroid of the map. Culturally idiosyncratic traits from these 
three samples occurred with very high frequencies in the respective samples and very 
low frequencies in all the other samples; this tendency was somewhat less accentuated 
in the case of the New Zealand sample. The biplot shows indeed that New Zealand has 
the most overlap with all other samples, the Filipino and Brazilian sample overlap more 
with each other than they do with the German sample, and the German sample has the 
least overlap with the other samples.  
Taking the trait categories in the triangle of the biplot as an anchor for 
interpretation, we found surprisingly that Brazilian trait categories are more about the 
‘moral self’ (e.g., being serious, educated), whereas Filipino, German and New Zealand 
trait categories are more about relations to others (e.g., being kind, helpful, and 
trustworthy). Walker and Pitts (1998) also reported a self-other distinction in their moral 
prototype study with Canadian participants, however, their distinction differs somewhat 
from ours. They found self-focused attributes that are more directly related to morality 
(e.g. being righteous, having high standards, p. 414). However, the self-focused 
associations of the Brazilian sample are only distantly related to the concept of a ‘moral 
person’ and could in fact be applied to a number of other persons, too. This may point to 
a broader definition of morality in the Brazilian culture. Yet, given that this finding is 
somewhat surprising and not fitting well with any moral theories, we are cautious in 
interpreting it any further.   
As expected, German trait categories that are highly central are those that reflect 
a rights-based morality, characterized by moral trait categories that indicate an 
individualized and flexible orientation towards moral standards (e.g., being open-
minded, a trait category that was mostly defined by the free-listed attributes ´tolerant´; 
and being critical which was mainly free-listed as ´critical thinking´). Both the Brazilian 
CULTURAL CONCEPTIONS OF MORALITY  
16 
 
and Filipino trait categories have in common that they deal more with a ‘duty-based’ 
morality (e.g., being religious, well-mannered, and responsible). Their perception of a 
moral person reflects a more obligational and communal kind of morality targeted at 
maintaining already existing moral standards1.  
 Figure 1  
Comparison of Free-listed Moral Trait Categories with Explicit Value Ratings 
We finally compared moral values that are implicitly assessed with the prototype 
technique to explicit value ratings. In order to do so, we matched the moral trait 
categories to values from the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1992). Only 
values that Schwartz´ (1992) found to be equivalent across cultures were included in the 
matching procedure. To enhance the number of matches, moral trait categories that 
occurred with a frequency of less than five percent in all samples were also included. 
When matching these attributes, we were guided not only by the trait category and value 
label, but also by all free-listed attributes that make up a moral trait category and the 
defining phrases of the values from the SVS (e.g., the moral trait category well-
mannered consists of the free-listed attributes ´courteous, tactful, polite, well-raised´ 
and therefore corresponds to the Schwartz value politeness, defined as ´courtesy, good 
manners´). There were moral trait categories that corresponded directly to a value from 
the SVS (e.g., helpful) and moral trait categories that were semantically equivalent (e.g., 
the trait category conservative/ conventional corresponding to the SVS value respect for 
tradition defined as ´preservation of time-honoured customs´). A total of 36 moral trait 
categories corresponded to values in the SVS and were further categorized into value 
types according to Schwartz’ value theory (1992).2  
Table 3 provides an overview of pan-cultural and culture-specific frequencies of 
the moral trait categories falling under Schwartz’ value types. Note that hedonism 
CULTURAL CONCEPTIONS OF MORALITY  
17 
 
values did not occur at all. Some of the value types were accessed significantly more 
frequently than others (pan-cultural sample: χ2(8) = 266.09, p < .001; Germany: χ2(7) = 
53.54, p < .001; New Zealand: χ2(7) = 70.00, p < .001; Brazil: χ2(5) = 66.75, p < .001; 
The Philippines: χ2(7) = 56.13, p < .001)3. Moral trait categories that were accessed 
most frequently, after adjusting by both number of participants and number of values in 
the respective value type, belonged to benevolence values followed by conformity and 
universalism values. One exception is the Filipino sample for which moral trait 
categories belonging to tradition and conformity value types were accessed most 
frequently. 
Table 3 
As can be seen from Table 3, the rank ordering of the moral trait categories is 
fairly similar across cultural samples. The average Spearman correlation between 
cultural samples was relatively high with a value of .88 (for frequencies adjusted by the 
number of participants in the respective sample, Σf/n) and .80 (for frequencies adjusted 
by both number of participants and number of values in the respective value type, 
Σf/nk). Therefore, matching moral trait categories with Schwartz’ (1992) value types 
rendered the cultural samples more similar to each other.  
In order to correlate the frequencies of free-listings with Schwartz´ (1992) 
explicit average ratings of the ten value types, we used data from Schwartz and Bardi’s 
(2001) pan-cultural value hierarchy (across 54 nations) based on students’ importance 
ratings of the SVS. In addition, we used culture-specific data from an unpublished 
values study (see Vauclair, et al., 2013): students from Brazil (N = 141), Germany (N = 
68), New Zealand (N = 73), and the Philippines (N = 73) responded to a shortened 
version of the SVS and rated whether the values were (1) personally important to them 
(comparable to the original SVS instruction), (2) a moral value to them, and (3) 
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perceived as a societal expectation. We found that the moral trait categories were not 
reliably related to personal value hierarchies or perceived societal expectations. 
However, they correlated significantly with the personal moral value hierarchies (see 
Table 4). This correlation pattern was prevalent in both the pan-cultural sample as well 
as in the four culture-specific samples. Hence, people´s associations of what it means to 
be a moral person seem to reflect their personal moral values (and not the perceived 
societal expectations) which are fairly similar across cultures when matched with 
Schwartz´ (1992) value types. Benevolence, universalism and conformity were here the 
value types that ranked highest which is consistent with Helkama´s (2004) functional 
theory of morality. Societal expectations on the other hand may reflect the actual 
normative pressure about how to behave and what to value, which is considerably 
different and more culturally dependent than the high ideals and abstract values of a 
personal morality.  
- Table 4 – 
General Discussion 
Our study showed that there are cultural differences and similarities in the 
conceptualization of the moral person. Consistent with our synthesis of moral theories 
presented in the introduction, we found that there were widely shared attributes which are 
related to issues of justice and welfare. This is in line with the moral universalism 
perspective (Kohlberg, 1984; Turiel, 1983) and corroborates the widespread ‘human 
obsession’ with fairness, reciprocity and justice (Graham, et al., 2009) as well as the 
importance of social cooperation as emphasized by evolutionary theorists (Richerson & 
Boyd, 2005). As expected, we found that duty-based concerns, i.e. concerns about 
obligations, obedience and respect for (social or religious) authority, were mentioned 
more often in collectivistic-oriented samples. Yet, rights-based concerns, i.e. concerns 
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about self-determined moral thinking that is not affected by any other (social or religious) 
authority, were more salient in the individualistic-oriented German sample. It is 
noteworthy, that the biplot of the correspondence analysis also shows trait categories that 
diverge from our interpretation. For instance, the trait obedient, which can be conceived 
as a trait representing conformity, was mentioned frequently in the individualistic-
oriented German sample. As so often in psychological research, the findings show a trend 
and no clear cut results in absolute terms. It is the pattern of relative accessibility of trait 
categories that illustrates which moral orientation is more salient in which culture.  
These findings extend our knowledge on moral psychology in an important way. 
They suggest that cultural differences in morality cannot just be reduced to the number 
of moral codes people use as previously claimed in contemporary moral theories (see e.g., 
Haidt, et al., 1993). All of our samples used predominantly two moral codes when 
associating attributes with the moral person4, i.e. the moral code of justice and welfare 
and more frequently either the moral code of duties or rights depending on the culture 
they come from. Hence, the difference is not in the number of moral codes, but in the 
emphasis laid on a rights- or duties-based morality. We think this is an important finding 
as it points to an underlying bipolar dimension of morality. This bipolar dimension may 
help in unpackaging culture to examine cultural variation in moral attitudes and beliefs 
(see e.g., Vauclair & Fischer, 2011). For instance, Schwartz´ cultural value dimension 
Autonomy-Embeddedness seems closely related to the rights and duties polarization. In 
autonomy cultures, people express their own preferences and ideas and pursue positive 
experiences for themselves. In embeddedness cultures, people emphasize the status quo 
and restrain themselves in order not to disrupt in-group solidarity or the traditional order 
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(Schwartz, 2006b). This parallels very much the person-centred and system-oriented 
morality inherent in the rights and duties moral codes.  
The rights and duties dimension also helps in interpreting past research on moral 
issues in which there is no harm involved or the perception of harm depends on the 
interpretation of the issue. For instance, Vauclair and Fischer (2011) found that people in 
autonomy-oriented cultures were more lenient in their judgment of, for example, 
homosexuality, abortion, and divorce, than people in embeddedness-oriented cultures. 
People in autonomy cultures adopt a person-centred moral orientation in their moral 
judgment, and therefore, believe that each individual should have a maximum liberty in 
her choices and a maximum likelihood to fulfill her potential (see also Chiu, et al., 1997). 
This finding could not be explained with Shweder et al.´s (1997) three ethics or Graham 
et al.´s (2009) two moral foundations since the rights component of morality and the 
universal justice and welfare concerns are blended into one single moral code.  
Finally, this study also showed that when moral trait categories are matched with 
Schwartz´ (1992) ten value types, the implicit moral value hierarchy, which is based on 
frequencies of trait categories, correlated significantly with explicit measures of personal 
moral values, but not with personal importance ratings or societal expectation ratings of 
values. Hence, there is a significant association between implicit and explicit measures 
of moral values meaning that different methods of assessing intrinsic moral values 
converge (cf. Campbell & Fiske, 1959). Moreover, the three most important moral values 
in the intrinsic moral value hierarchy are benevolence, universalism, and conformity 
supporting Helkama´s (2004) reasoning that these values serve universal social functions 
of morality in regard to promotion of prosocial actions, moral problem-solving, and 
control of antisocial action. Forcing the free-listed moral attributes into the Schwartz´ 
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(1992) value types diminished the cultural differences and rendered the samples more 
similar to each other. We think that there are two reasons for this finding, one is theoretical 
and the other methodological in nature.  
First, universalism and benevolence refer to the previously claimed universal 
justice and welfare concerns, and therefore it is not surprising that they rank highly in 
the moral value hierarchy across samples. Somewhat more contradictory is the rank 
order for conformity given that we found an important cultural variation in the free-
listings regarding the salience of duties. Conformity is in fact, to some extent, 
fundamental for every social group in ascertaining smooth social relations and has 
developed very early in human evolution (Moghaddam, et al., 2000). We think that 
people from different cultures might commonly agree that conformity is important in 
upholding the moral order. However, there may be subtle differences in the meaning of 
conformity when it is assessed with different methods. Conformity, as assessed with the 
values of the SVS, may be interpreted as conforming to certain abstract standards or 
moral ground rules necessary for the smooth functioning of every social group. On the 
other hand, conformity as it emerges with the free-listing procedure can be interpreted 
as conforming with social or religious authorities that define the moral standards. These 
two conceptualizations of conformity are fundamentally different in regard to the 
motivational underpinnings of human morality, juxtaposing an intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation to conform.  
Second, closed-ended self-report questionnaires, such as the SVS, contain an 
important methodological limitation (see also Smith, et al., 1997). They are expert-
designed category systems, and in the case of the SVS, ask respondents to rate very 
general and abstract goals. Regardless of culture, the general goals of morality are to 
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promote and protect positive relations of self to others. This can be fulfilled with the 
values of universalism, benevolence and conformity and this is why respondents 
recognize these values as moral values across different cultures. However, if there are 
no constraints at all imposed upon respondents, people from different cultures can 
access their cultural conception of morality. For instance, being critical emerged as a 
trait category that defines a rights-based morality, yet it is not a value that appears in the 
SVS. Hence, the group-generated prototype provides an insight into which attributes are 
most salient in a specific culture without constraining individuals´ responses to pre-
defined categories and yields therefore a more culturally refined conceptualization of 
morality than expert-designed category systems can provide.  
Limitations 
The series of analyses in this study have produced an insight into what it means 
to be a ‘moral’ person in different cultures. When drawing conclusions from the findings, 
there are also limitations to consider. One of them is the different proportion of females 
in the samples. The New Zealand sample showed the highest proportion of females which 
leads to the question whether the responses may not exhibit a gender effect as opposed to 
a cultural effect. Gender differences in morality have been discussed in moral psychology 
since Gilligan (1982), who argued that women adopt the principle of care in their moral 
reasoning. However, a careful analysis of the literature by Walker (1991) revealed that 
studies of moral reasoning have generally failed to find gender differences. Moreover, 
Walker and Pitts (1998) found that men and women were very similar in their moral 
prototypes and concluded that they share a common conception of the ‘moral person’. 
Even though, it is not possible to fully exclude gender as an explanation for the emerging 
New Zealand moral trait categories, it seems very unlikely that it has induced a substantial 
bias.  
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We acknowledge that religion may also be an alternative explanation for the 
differences we found between the cultural samples. Although all samples were drawn 
from predominantly Christian cultures to control for this potential confound, it does not 
exclude the possibility that the samples differ in their levels of religiosity which may 
have influenced the moral trait associations. It might be that the Filipino and Brazilian 
sample associate more duty-based trait categories than the German sample, because they 
are more religious. It is noteworthy that it is difficult to delineate religious from cultural 
moral codes. Both are based on obligations, duties, obedience and respect for 
authorities, which may have a social or religious source (Haidt, et al., 1993). This is also 
evident in Haidt´s (2008) moral foundation theory in which he merged religious moral 
concerns (purity/sancity) with community moral concerns (ingroup/loyalty and 
authority/respect) into the binding foundation of morality. Hence, religious and duty-
based cultural concerns are difficult to distinguish theoretically as well as empirically as 
evident in our and past studies (see also Shweder, et al., 1997).  
Conclusion 
There are two main conclusions that we draw from our study. First, if cultural 
differences are the research focus in morality, imposing constraints through expert-
designed category systems may in fact mask any differences. Moreover, it narrows the 
scope of inquiry onto the researcher’s definition of morality which may reflect the 
universal functions of morality or obscure hidden cultural conceptions of morality. 
Adopting a descriptive approach and examining a layperson´s perspective provides an 
important insight into everyday morality as conceived in different cultures with the 
potential to inform theory development, such as the inclusion of a separate moral code 
defined by the importance of personal rights (e.g., expressed in gay rights, women´s 
rights) that varies cross-culturally in its emphasis.  
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Last not least, an important theoretical contribution of this study is that we 
provide evidence for the notion that there is an opposite pole to the concept of duties 
(i.e. the concept of rights) that is not equivalent to the universal justice and welfare 
concerns as suggested in contemporary theories and research on human morality (e.g., 
Graham, et al., 2006; Shweder, et al., 1997). This provides also a new perspective on 
the moral disagreements in the American ´culture war´ (see Graham, et al., 2007). 
Political liberals and conservatives may agree on basic aspects of social cooperation 
(e.g., not intentionally harming someone with no reason, not to deceive one another), 
yet there are large disagreements whether the moral order is seen as fixed (pre-defined 
by a social or religious authority) or malleable (subjected to challenge and social 
change, see also Chiu, et al., 1997). This has important implications for the moral 
discourse between different (sub)cultures and therefore, intergroup and intercultural 
relations.  
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Footnotes 
 
1 The triangular shape of the correspondence analysis may have been caused by outliers 
(prevalence of culture-specific moral trait categories) which may lead to an 
overestimation of cultural dissimilarities in the perceptual map. Two additional analyses 
were conducted to examine whether the result is dependent on the attributes included in 
the analysis. The first analysis was based on central moral trait categories, but excluded 
all culturally idiosyncratic moral trait categories. The second analysis was conducted 
using all 49 (central and peripheral) moral trait categories. In both analyses, the same 
triangular shape emerged and the cultural groups were arranged in the same fashion as in 
Figure 2. Hence, the relative association of the four cultural samples was replicated with 
different sets of moral trait categories. Moreover, the analyses on all 49 trait categories 
corroborated the interpretation of the trait clusters as referring to duties, rights, and the 
moral self (e.g., the trait categories humble, tolerant, and dignified were more strongly 
associated with the Filipino, German, and Brazilian sample respectively). More details 
on these analyses and findings can be obtained from the first author.  
2 We would like to point out that there were a number of trait categories that did not fit 
with Schwartz’ values, such as being friendly, generous, and kind which constitute a 
set of moral values that is not assessed in the SVS. 
3 Chi-square statistics were computed on frequencies corrected for number of values in 
a value type.  
                                                             
CULTURAL CONCEPTIONS OF MORALITY  
33 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
4 Note that we do not interpret the moral self trait cluster in the Brazilian sample as a 
separate moral code at this stage. Future research is needed to ascertain that the 
attributes referring to the ´self´ constitute indeed a separate moral code.   
